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ENFORCING SETTLEMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS
JEFFREY A. PARNESS *
MATTHEW R. WALKER **
INTRODUCTION
Settlements in civil actions in federal district courts may be subject to later
judicial enforcement. However, as noted in the 1994 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, any
enforcement “requires its own basis for jurisdiction.”1 Such jurisdiction
seemingly can arise under one of two different heads of ancillary jurisdiction in
the absence of an “independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”2 One head allows
enforcement where the settlement is “in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent”3 with a claim that had been presented for adjudication. The
other permits enforcement when necessary for the district court “to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and
effectuate its decrees.”4
In Kokkonen, there was not a basis for independent jurisdiction and neither
head of ancillary jurisdiction supported the enforcement of a settlement that
earlier prompted a voluntary dismissal.5 Any claim for settlement breach had
“nothing to do” with any claim earlier presented for resolution, making it neither
“necessary nor even particularly efficient that they be adjudicated together.”6
Further, the settlement was not “made part of the order of dismissal”;7 thus, any
breach would not be “a violation”8 of a court order implicating the “court’s
power to protect its proceedings and vindicate its authority.”9
Since Kokkonen, the lower federal courts have struggled with requests for the
exercise of ancillary settlement enforcement jurisdiction. Troubling issues
include when and how ancillary enforcement jurisdiction should be retained,
when such jurisdiction should later be exercised, and what substantive laws and
procedures should be employed in settlement enforcement proceedings. Neither
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby College;
J.D., University of Chicago.
** B.A., Northern Illinois University; J.D., Northern University College of Law.
1. 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
2. Id. at 382.
3. Id. at 379.
4. Id. at 380. Herein, we employ the term “ancillary jurisdiction” as it was used in
Kokkonen, recognizing that, at times, other terms are used, including pendent, supplemental,
residual, derivative, essential, and inherent jurisdiction, as well as jurisdiction of necessity.
5. While the dismissal occurred under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(ii), id. at 378, the analysis
would have been the same with a dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2), id. at 381; in both
settings, a court order recognizing the settlement was required for any ancillary jurisdiction.
6. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
7. Id. at 381.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 380.
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the Supreme Court in its common law decisions or court rules, nor Congress in
statutes, has provided significant guidance. Troubles will likely continue as civil
case settlements are being promoted more than ever. The federal district courts
recently were expressly directed to facilitate civil settlements and, in order to do
so, were authorized to require both party and attorney participation in settlement
conferences.10 After reviewing Kokkonen and some contemporary difficulties,
we will suggest both lawmaking mechanisms and legal standards for improving
settlement enforcement.
I. SETTLEM ENT ENFORCEM ENT UNDER KOKKONEN
Federal district courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction,
generally possessing only powers allowed by the federal constitution and
authorized by federal statutes.11 To date, there have been no statutes or court
rules governing the retention and exercise of jurisdiction over settlements
reached in pending federal civil actions.12 Given the lack of written laws, some
federal courts before 1994 had liberally employed an “inherent powers” doctrine,
or similar devices, to enforce settlement agreements reached in civil litigation.13
Other federal courts were more reticent, leaving most enforcement to the state
courts. Some guidance was provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1994 in
Kokkonen. Unfortunately, the ruling in Kokkonen addressed only some issues,
leaving many questions on settlement enforcement unanswered, and prompting
continuing uncertainties and confusion.
The Kokkonen case initially involved a dispute over the termination of Matt
T. Kokkonen’s general agency with Guardian Life Insurance Company.14 His
state court lawsuit was subject to a removal to a federal district court based upon

10. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c). For our thoughts on needed amendments to the rule on settlement
conferences in federal civil actions, see Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside
the Civil Case Box: Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 KAN. L. REV. 347 (2002).
11. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 380 (indicating that authorization need not be express, with
nonexpress authority sometimes characterized as inherent, ancillary, or essential). There may be
small realms of authority beyond congressional control. See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.,
757 F.2d 557, 562-63 (3d Cir. 1985) (describing “irreducible inherent authority”). But see
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48 n.12 (1991) (noting the absence of Supreme Court
precedents recognizing such judicial authority).
12. Congress has delegated to the Article III federal courts certain rulemaking responsibilities
regarding their own powers. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000) (permitting courts to prescribe
“rules for the conduct of their business”).
13. See, e.g., Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1980) (“inherent power to enforce”);
Kukla v. Nat’l Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973) (“inherent power”).
14. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376. Consider: “The complaint, as amended, stated causes of
action for wrongful termination, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with prospective business
advantage, fraud, breach of lease, wrongful denial of lease, and prayed for damages, including
exemplary damages.” Petitioner’s Brief at *4 n.2, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
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diversity jurisdiction where a jury trial was commenced.15 During trial, the
parties reached an oral agreement settling all claims and counterclaims. The key
terms of the agreement were recited on the record before the district judge in
chambers.16 “[T]he parties executed a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice”17 which the district judge signed “under the notation ‘It is so
ordered.’”18 The stipulation and order mentioned neither the settlement nor any
retention of jurisdiction. When a dispute involving Kokkonen’s “obligation to
return certain files”19 under the settlement later arose, Guardian Life moved in
the same civil action for enforcement. Kokkonen opposed the motion on the
ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court found
it could enforce because it had “an ‘inherent power’ to do so.”20 The court of
appeals affirmed, relying on an “inherent supervisory power.”21
After noting that the federal courts were “courts of limited jurisdiction,”22
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, emphasized that Guardian Life had
sought the enforcement of the settlement agreement, not the reopening of the
case. He observed that some, but not all, courts of appeals had held that
15. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376.
16. Id. (indicating that “the substance” of the agreement was recited). Guardian Life argued
that because of this in camera recitation, the judge “plainly anticipated that any proceeding to
enforce the settlement agreement would require an appearance before him and not in state court.”
Respondent’s Brief at *4, Kokkonen ( No. 93-263). The court of appeals wrote that the “oral
agreement . . . was stated in its entirety on the record before the district court in chambers.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 93-263, 1993 WL 164884, at *1 (9th Cir. May 18,
1993).
17. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-77.
18. Id. at 377.
19. Id. Guardian also claimed Kokkonen breached the settlement by communicating to
Guardian on behalf of a client who was a Guardian policyholder. Petitioner’s Brief at *6 n.8,
Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
20. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
21. Id.
22. Id. Kokkonen framed the issue before the Supreme Court by asking,
does a federal district court have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement
agreement entered into between the parties when: 1) the case is no longer pending
before the court at the time the court issued the order, having been dismissed with
prejudice prior to the application for enforcement of the settlement agreement, 2) the
settlement agreement has never been incorporated into an order or judgment of the court
disposing of the action, 3) the court has not expressly retained jurisdiction over the
action, and 4) no other independent grounds for federal court jurisdiction to enforce the
agreement exist?
Petitioner’s Brief at *i, Kokkonen (No. 93-263). Guardian Life framed the issue by asking: “Does
a district court have jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to enforce a settlement agreement after
dismissal of the case where the settlement was entered into on the record, at trial, with the Court’s
active participation, and where the Court anticipated its involvement in any enforcement of the
agreement?” Respondent’s Brief at *i, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
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reopening the case in such circumstances was available.23 In contrast to
reopening, Justice Scalia explained that enforcement, “whether through award
of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than just a continuation
or renewal of a dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for
jurisdiction.”24 In denying that there was any enforcement power, Justice Scalia
cited the absence of an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction or any
ancillary jurisdiction.25 Yet, Justice Scalia recognized that there were two types
of ancillary jurisdiction that might have been available. Ancillary jurisdiction
can be exercised “(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are,
in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent . . . and (2) to enable a
court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees.”26 Justice Scalia found that any earlierpresented claims and the settlement claim presented by Guardian were not
factually interdependent as they had “nothing to do with each other.”27 In the
case, he also found that any power to enforce the settlement unaccompanied by
a retention of jurisdiction was “quite remote from what courts require in order
to perform their functions.”28 He observed that “the only order here was that the
suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in no way flouted or imperiled by the
alleged breach of the settlement agreement.”29 He noted that

23. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6)). The idea of reopening a case
was discussed at some length during the oral arguments in Kokkonen. Transcript of Oral
Arguments, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
24. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. Of course, where a federal civil action, once dismissed, is
continued or renewed, there must also be subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, such jurisdiction differs
significantly from enforcement jurisdiction in that only with the former is there a return to the
claims that prompted the civil action, and thus in effect, a resumption of jurisdiction. Of course,
where a state law claim in a federal civil action remains under supplemental jurisdiction after the
federal law claims, providing the independent jurisdictional basis is dismissed, there are continuing
inquiries into jurisdictional basis. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000) (granting courts discretion to decline
to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction).
25. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
26. Id. at 379-80.
27. Id. at 380 (concluding “it would neither be necessary nor even particularly efficient that
[the claims] be adjudicated together”). Evidently, the claims and counterclaims on which the jury
trial was commenced had little or nothing to do with the postjudgment dispute over the return of
certain files by Kokkonen. As well, seemingly efficiency would not be promoted by district court
settlement enforcement as there was no indication that the district judge was in a unique position
to interpret the settlement terms involving the return of the files. But cf. Neuberg v. Michael Reese
Hosp. Found., 123 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the judge who presided over the
lawsuit was in the “best position to evaluate the settlement agreement”); Scelsa v. City Univ. of
New York, 76 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1996) (“there are few persons in a better position to understand
the meaning of an order of dismissal than the district judge who ordered it”).
28. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
29. Id.
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[t]he situation would be quite different if the parties’ obligation to
comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part
of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a
provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement agreement) or by
incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.30
“In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.”31
Although the district court “is authorized to embody the settlement contract in its
dismissal order (or, what has the same effect, retain jurisdiction over the
settlement contract) if the parties agree,”32 Justice Scalia further wrote that a
failure to do so means “enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state
courts.”33 The “judge’s mere awareness and approval of the terms of the
settlement agreement”34 were insufficient to make those terms a part of the court
order, and thus to prompt ancillary jurisdiction.35
So, the Supreme Court recognized two ways in which a federal district court
could enforce a civil case settlement for a case that had been dismissed.36 One
way involved settlement claims that were factually interdependent with the
30. Id. at 381. The import of this difference was not said to be reflected in any written federal
law. Cf. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/502(d) (2001) (stating that either the terms of a marriage
dissolution agreement may be “set forth” in a judgment or that the marriage dissolution case
judgment “shall identify the agreement and state that the court has approved its terms,” in a setting
where such an agreement often is subject to later judicial modification, as where the agreement
covers support, custody or visitation of children). This difference has also been deemed important
outside the settlement enforcement arena. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting
importance to prevailing party status when attorney fee recovery may be available under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). Compare Roberson v. Giuliani, 2002 WL 253950 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
21, 2002) (noting that not all retentions of settlement enforcement jurisdiction prompt prevailing
party status under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
31. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381.
32. Id. at 381-82.
33. Id. at 382.
34. Id. at 381.
35. In contrast to federal district courts, when civil actions are settled in the courts of appeal,
there is no discretion available to retain jurisdiction over possible settlement breaches. See, e.g.,
Herrnreiter v. C.H.A., 281 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2002) (“a court of appeals lacks factfinding
apparatus”).
36. Of course, in the absence of a dismissal and a judgment thereon, enforcement could also
occur where a pleading was amended to reflect the settlement. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of the
Alexandria Condo. v. Broadway/72nd Assocs., 729 N.Y.S.2d 16 (App. Div. 2001). Yet here too
a federal court would need subject matter jurisdiction, often arising under the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), because of factual relatedness. But see Sadighi v.
Daghighfekr, 66 F. Supp. 2d 752, 758 (D.S.C. 1999) (quoting Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 664
(7th Cir. 1994) (“a district court possesses the inherent or equitable power summarily to enforce
an agreement to settle a case pending before it”) (alteration in original)).
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claims presented for court resolution, making adjudication before one trial court
“efficient.”37 The other way involved settlement enforcement that promoted
successful court functioning. While some found that the analysis in Kokkonen
led to simple rules,38 applications of its principles have proven to be difficult.
Troubles have already arisen regarding such matters as how to incorporate
settlement terms into court orders; how otherwise to retain jurisdiction; whether
settlement disputes may prompt the reopening of judgments; and what
substantive contract laws and what procedures should apply when federal case
settlements are enforced. We find further difficulties in the application of
Kokkonen which, to date, have gone largely unrecognized. These difficulties
include whether there is judicial discretion to refuse party requests that future
enforcement jurisdiction be retained, and whether and when any settlement
disputes can prompt discretionary refusals to exercise available enforcement
jurisdiction.
II. DIFFICULTIES IN SETTLEM ENT ENFORCEM ENT AFTER KOKKONEN
A. Incorporating Settlement Terms into Court Orders
Under Kokkonen, a federal district court may enforce a civil case settlement
order after “incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.”39
Questions have arisen on how settlement terms are properly incorporated. Must
all key “terms” be included? If not, which, if any, absent terms are subject to
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction?
And, what conduct constitutes
“incorporation”? The lower courts seem unsure.
The Eighth Circuit has found that a “dismissal order’s mere reference to the
fact of settlement does not incorporate the settlement agreement.”40 The
dismissal order did acknowledge that all matters were settled, but did not
otherwise mention the agreement or any of its terms.41 The appeals court noted
that “although Kokkonen does not state how a district court may incorporate a
settlement agreement in a dismissal order, the case does not suggest the

37. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
38. One commentator suggested that Kokkonen “supplies clear guidelines for seeking”
supervision of settlement agreements. Charles K. Bloeser, Notes and Comments, Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life: Limiting the Power of Federal District Courts to Enforce Settlement Agreements
in Dismissed Cases, 30 TULSA L.J. 671, 691 (1995). Another said: “For those seeking to ensure
federal jurisdiction over agreements settling cases pending in federal court, Kokkonen provides a
simple answer.” Bradley S. Clanton, Note, Inherent Powers and Settlement Agreements: Limiting
Federal Enforcement Jurisdiction, 15 MISS. C. L. REV. 453, 475 (1995). The petitioner in
Kokkonen had called “for a ‘bright line’ rule that will guide district courts in the future.”
Petitioner’s Brief at *17, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
39. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. 381.
40. Miener v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1995).
41. Id. at 1127-28.
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agreement must be ‘embodied’ in the dismissal order.”42 Therefore, the court
found that reference to, or even approval of, the settlement agreement was, by
itself, insufficient to prompt later enforcement jurisdiction.43 It did not explain
relevant differences between varying nonembodied agreements.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that an order based on a settlement, without more,
did not place the agreement within the order.44 The court stated that the
“settlement terms must be part of the dismissal in order for violation of the
settlement agreement to amount to a violation of the court’s order.”45 Thus, the
court concluded that “[w]ithout a violation of the court’s order, there is no
jurisdiction.”46
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the “phrase ‘pursuant to the terms of the
Settlement’ fails to incorporate the terms of the Settlement agreement into the
order.”47 The lower court had specifically stated: “In the presence of and with
the assistance of counsel, the parties placed a settlement agreement on the record
before the Hon. Bernard Friedman on October 1, 1991. Pursuant to the terms of
the parties’ October 1, 1991 settlement agreement, the Court hereby DISMISSES
this case.”48
Some appellate courts have determined that when some, but not all the
provisions, of a civil case settlement are placed in a dismissal order, only the
incorporated terms are subject to later enforcement proceedings. The Seventh
Circuit explained that “[h]aving put some but not all of the terms in the
judgment, the district court has identified which it will enforce and which it will
not.” It further stated that any violation of settlement terms not in a judgment do
not “flout the court’s order or imperil the court’s authority” and thus “do not
activate the ancillary jurisdiction of the court.”49 The Tenth Circuit held
similarly, stating “[a]lthough the district court specified in its order that it
retained jurisdiction, and although it set forth some provisions of the parties’
settlement agreement, it did not expressly set forth the provision prohibiting
communications to the media.”50 Yet, not all judges may now deny enforcement
42. Id. at 1128.
43. Id.
44. O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1995).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Caudill v. N. Am. Media Corp., 200 F.3d 914, 917 (6th Cir. 2000). The court cited In
Re Phar-Mor, Inc. Securities Litigation, 172 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Miener v. Mo.
Dep’t of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126, 1128 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The phrase ‘pursuant to the terms
of the Settlement’ fails to incorporate the terms of the Settlement agreement into the order.”)). See
also McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2000).
48. Caudill, 200 F.3d at 915.
49. Lucille v. City of Chicago, 31 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir. 1994).
50. Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Ind., 84 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1996).
Interestingly, the lower court’s order of dismissal stated:
Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in any way, the Court reserves continuing
jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of the terms of the Stipulation of
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of unincorporated settlement terms,51 especially where breaches of incorporated
and unincorporated terms are alleged simultaneously and where all issues are
factually interdependent so that their joint resolution promotes efficiency.52 We
favor a bright line test whereby only settlement terms incorporated into court
orders (or otherwise referenced particularly) are subject to possible enforcement
jurisdiction. Where necessary, efficiency in hearing incorporated and
unincorporated pacts together usually can be achieved by a federal court refusal
to exercise jurisdiction over the referenced terms, leaving all related matters for
a new state court lawsuit.53
Under Kokkonen, incorporation of settlement terms into a court order is one
way to anticipate enforcement jurisdiction. Another way is through a provision
retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.54
B. Retaining Settlement Enforcement Jurisdiction
Under Kokkonen, a federal district court can also enforce if it retains
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.55 Questions have arisen. Can
jurisdiction be retained even though the phrase, ‘retaining jurisdiction,’ or
something like it, is not used? If so, what other terms or actions suffice? At
times, are the intentions of the parties and the judge sufficient regardless of the
words used? And, can enforcement ever occur after a dismissal where there is
no incorporation, no expressly retained jurisdiction, and no subjective intent, but
where the exercise of jurisdiction makes sense at the time when enforcement is

Settlement and any issues relating to Subclass membership, notice to Class Members,
distributions to Class Members, allocation of expenses among the class, disposition of
unclaimed payment amounts, and all other aspects of this action, until all acts agreed to
be performed under the Stipulation of Settlement shall have been performed and the
final order of dismissal referenced above has become effective or until October 1, 1996,
whichever occurs latest.
Id. at 369. It is not clear to us the district judge did not intend to enforce the agreement on media
communications, or that its absence is significant given the order’s coverage of “all other aspects
of this action.”
51. See, e.g., Brewer v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331 (Ill. 1995) (stating the
court could enforce a term in the settlement agreement (employee would quit his job) not
incorporated into the dismissal order though other terms were included in the order (pursuant to
Illinois Code of Civ. Pro. 2-1203, a trial court retains jurisdiction thirty days after entry of
judgment)).
52. Of course, in this situation already bootstrapped claims would themselves prompt even
more bootstrapping with the unincorporated terms possibly very far removed from the original civil
action and perhaps even unknown to the district court until enforcement was sought.
53. Refusals are permitted even when some ancillary enforcement jurisdiction was earlier
retained since all ancillary jurisdiction is discretionary. See Part III.G, infra.
54. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
55. Id. See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291,
299 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating “court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement of the parties”).
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sought?
The Second Circuit has held that “[o]nce the District Court ‘so ordered’ the
settlement agreement, which included a provision for sealing the case file, it was
required to enforce the terms of the agreement,”56 unless “limited circumstances”
permit modification of the “so ordered” stipulation. It reasoned that when a court
orders a stipulated and sealed settlement, it accepts certain responsibilities,
including a duty to enforce even where there is no court order retaining
jurisdiction or incorporating any settlement terms.57
In another case, a district judge issued an order stating that any “subsequent
order setting forth different terms and conditions relative to the settlement and
dismissal of the within action shall supersede the within order.”58 The appellate
court stated that “[o]f course, the court may only enter subsequent orders
involving the settlement agreement if it has retained jurisdiction.”59 It found that
Kokkonen “only requires a reasonable indication that the court has retained
jurisdiction,” as the Kokkonen court used the term “such as” when speaking of
a separate provision retaining jurisdiction.60 The court held that the language
employed by the district court contemplated a continuing judicial role sufficient
to constitute a “separate provision” retaining jurisdiction.61
The Eighth Circuit found enforcement jurisdiction was not retained where
a dismissal order only stated that the court was “‘reserving jurisdiction’ to permit
any party to reopen the [civil] action.”62 It said that reopening due to a settlement
breach was different from enforcing a settlement.63
Yet another appeals court ruled that the trial court “need only manifest its
intent to retain jurisdiction.”64 The court found this intent in a district court order
that declared dismissal was “pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement” and
expressly authorized each party to enforce the agreement in the event of breach.65
The court reasoned “that a district court need not use explicit language or ‘any
magic form of words.’”66
In contrast, a different appeals court held that the mere intent to retain
jurisdiction is insufficient.67 It stated:
At the time the civil case was settled, it is clear that the district court

56. Geller v. Branic Int’l Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 2000).
57. Id.
58. Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 643.
61. Id. at 645.
62. Sheng v. Starkey Lab., Inc., 53 F.3d 192, 195 (8th Cir. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Schaefer Fan Co. v. J&D Mfg., 265 F. 3d 1282, 1287 (Fed Cir. 2001) (quoting McCallBey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1188 (7th Cir. 1985)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).
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intended to retain jurisdiction. It stated at the settlement conference:
I will act as a czar with regard to the drafting of the settlement papers
and the construction of this settlement and the execution of this
settlement. And that means that if there is any dispute that is brought to
me by counsel, I will decide the matter according to proceedings which
I designate in the manner that I designate, and that decision will be final
without any opportunity to appeal.
That it believed it had continuing jurisdiction to enforce the agreement
is also clear from its order of January 28, 1993:
As part of the settlement agreement, plaintiff agreed not to provide
evidence to prosecute the Oregon State Bar complaint filed against
defendant and to take any and all reasonable actions to prevent that
matter from proceeding. The parties also agreed that the terms and
conditions of the settlement agreement were to remain confidential and
not disclosed to anyone. The parties further agreed that all questions
relating to their rights and duties under the agreement would be
determined exclusively by the undersigned.
It is equally clear, however, that the district court did not retain
jurisdiction over the settlement. As noted, the Dismissal neither
expressly reserves jurisdiction nor incorporates the terms of the
settlement agreement.68
This holding was later reaffirmed when the same court held that “even a district
court’s expressed intention to retain jurisdiction is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction if that intention is not expressed in the order of dismissal.”69
In the absence of incorporation, jurisdiction retention, or intent, judicial
enforcement of settlements still seems appropriate in certain settings. Parties to
a federal civil action ending in a judgment upon a settlement are unable to return
to the district court with an agreement indicating a new-found intent that
jurisdiction over an earlier settlement be retained.70 Yet, so long as a federal civil

68. Id. at 1433.
69. O’Connor v. Calvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1995).
70. See, e.g., Lane v. Birnbaum, 910 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court stated:
In this case, the Order of Dismissal preceded the Stipulation by almost two months. It
is therefore apparent that compliance with the agreement was not an operative part of
the dismissal. That the parties subsequently felt the need to have the terms of their
agreement embodied in a stipulation on file with the Court, cannot serve to vest the
Court with jurisdiction over the agreement. . . . Clearly, the Court’s dismissal of the
action was in no way conditioned upon the parties’ compliance with the terms of the
agreement. Nor did the Court retain jurisdiction over the parties’ agreement. Therefore,
enforcement of the settlement agreement is a matter of contract between the parties, for
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action remains open because there is no final judgment, a district court seemingly
may enforce a settlement therein even though the judge never earlier considered
enforcement.71 Thus, in dismissing a civil action upon a settlement, a trial judge
may reserve rendering a judgment as by granting a conditional dismissal, thereby
allowing a party to return to court for any reason, including settlement
enforcement, before a final judgment is entered.72
C. Discretionary Refusals of Later Settlement Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where any later settlement enforcement would not have “its own basis for
jurisdiction,”73 thus requiring some form of ancillary power, can a federal district
judge refuse to incorporate the settlement terms into a court order or otherwise
to retain enforcement jurisdiction though requested by all parties? The Supreme
Court in Kokkonen said that with any dismissal of a pending civil action based
on a settlement,74 potential enforcement is “in the court’s discretion.”75 This
comports with the longstanding principle that ancillary jurisdiction is
discretionary. What factors should guide such exercises of discretion?
One appeals court has urged caution when a federal district judge decides

the state courts to address.
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).
71. See, e.g., Sadighi v. Daghighfeker, 66 F. Supp. 2d 752 (D.S.C. 1999). The court stated:
[A]fter the court was informed that settlement had been reached, there was a delay when
no formal settlement documents were executed and no order of dismissal was issued.
Consequently, when Defendants decided that the settlement agreement reached earlier
was no longer to their satisfaction, the case was still on [the] court’s active
docket . . . . In short, nothing had been done to divest [the] court of jurisdiction.
Id. at 758.
72. See, e.g., Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F. 3d 447, 450 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that
Kokkonen is “distinguishable from our case, since here the district court’s order of dismissal
expressly provided that the parties could, within 60 days, move to reopen the case to enforce the
settlement. Defendants so moved within the 60 days of the dismissal order.”). Similar trial court
initiatives can be addressed in court rules. See, e.g., Form 7-345 of Florida Small Claims Rules
(“Stipulation for Installment Settlement, Order Approving Stipulation, and Dismissal,” under which
proceedings are stayed by agreement while settlement monies are paid over time, with an expressly
recognized enforcement power). Yet, conditional dismissal orders, without judgments, may permit
later settlement enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.
Mass. 1999) (stating conditional dismissal grounded on settlement where parties have sixty days
to return “to reopen the action if settlement is not consummated by the parties”); see also Pratt v.
Philbrook, 109 F.3d 18, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that the sixty-day procedure developed as
a mechanism to close cases “while retaining jurisdiction to enforce a settlement for a period of time
after closure is announced”).
73. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
74. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(ii) (“stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties”) and
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) (dismissal “upon order of the court”).
75. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381.
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whether to enter a consent decree. The Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he court,
however, must not merely sign on the line provided by the parties.”76 The court
opined that though a proposed decree has the consent of the parties, the judge
should not give perfunctory approval because the court’s duty is akin, but not
identical to its responsibility in approving settlements of class actions,
stockholders’ derivative suits, and proposed compromises of claims in
bankruptcy.”77 The appeals court declared that the trial court must ascertain
whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable.78 Where a proposed
consent decree, “by virtue of its injunctive provisions, reaches into the future and
has continuing effect,” the terms require careful scrutiny,79 presumedly because
a trial court is “a judicial body, not a recorder of contracts.”80
Another appeals court ruled a trial court must “ensure that its orders are fair
and lawful,” meaning that an agreement that is made part of an order necessarily
has judicial imprimatur and contemplates judicial “oversight.”81
For settlements that are not incorporated into court orders, but over which
enforcement jurisdiction may be retained, does discretion operate differently?
If so, should trial judges scrutinize such terms more or less carefully? While
these settlements are not consent decrees, they are also not wholly private
agreements.82 For us, it seems that in all settings district judges should exercise
at least some discretion before agreeing to enforce a civil case settlement
agreement if a dispute arises later.83 Thus, where enforcement jurisdiction is
retained but the settlement is not formally filed (as a record available to the
public),84 a copy of the settlement should not only be provided to the court, but
the court should also determine it is an appropriate subject for possible court
enforcement and oversight, though its terms normally do not need to receive full
judicial approval.85
76. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 440-41.
78. Id. at 441 n.13 (requiring further that the agreement must also have the valid consent of
the concerned parties and be “appropriate under the particular facts,” meaning “a reasonable factual
and legal determination based on the facts of record”).
79. Id. at 441 (stating further that the agreement cannot violate the “Constitution, statute, or
jurisprudence”).
80. Ho v. Martin Marietta Corp., 845 F.2d 545, 548 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988).
81. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 282 (4th Cir. 2002).
82. See, e.g., id. at 280 (“a private settlement, although it may resolve a dispute before a
court, ordinarily does not receive the approval of the court”).
83. For example, enforcement jurisdiction should not be retained where later disputes
inevitably would involve novel or complex issues of state law, or where there are “compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) & (4) (2000).
84. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002) (intervenor granted access to civil rights
settlement agreement that had been submitted for court “approval” and maintained under seal in
court’s file even though jurisdiction to enforce it was not retained).
85. See, e.g., Roberson v. Giuliani, 2002 WL 253950, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002)
(contract “provided” to court, but not filed or subject to “so ordered” judgment). Certainly, judges
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D. Reopening Federal Civil Actions
Under Kokkonen, a district court is enabled, in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion
to set aside a judgment, to influence, if not exercise jurisdiction over, a breached
settlement that had previously ended a civil action.86 If a breach of a settlement
can prompt post judgment relief overturning the settlement by reinstating the
claims, even though the settlement was never incorporated into the judgment and
enforcement jurisdiction was not otherwise retained, in most instances a new
settlement will simply follow.87
Prior to Kokkonen, the appellate courts were split on whether such a
settlement breach provided sufficient reason to grant a motion for judgment
modification.88 In Kokkonen, the court did not address the issue, finding “that

should never agree to enforce illegal or procedurally unconscionable settlement agreements. And
at times, in order to ensure fairness to certain parties, as with class actions and claims by minors,
judicial approval of the substance of settlements is required.
86. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 is entitled “Relief from Judgment or Order”and reads
in part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,
Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
87. We think such reopened cases have final settlement rates at least comparable to those for
other civil cases. In any event, it seems clear that most reopened cases will eventually settle, if they
do not otherwise end without trial.
88. Compare Fairfax Countywide Citizens v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1302-03 (4th
Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted) (holding that “upon repudiation of a settlement agreement which had
terminated litigation pending before it, a district court has the authority under Rule 60(b)(6) to
vacate its prior dismissal order and restore the case to its docket”), with Sawka v. Healtheast Inc.,
989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Assuming arguendo that Healtheast breached the terms of the
settlement agreement, that is no reason to set the judgment of dismissal aside, although it may give
rise to a cause of action to enforce the agreement. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may only be granted
under extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship
would occur.”) See also Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir.
1991) (“Repudiation of a settlement agreement that terminated litigation pending before a court
constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, and it justifies vacating the court’s prior dismissal
order.”); Harman v. Pauley, 678 F.2d 479, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1982) (in this case “interests of justice
do not require vacation of dismissal order”); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371
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what respondent seeks in this case is enforcement of the settlement agreement,
and not merely reopening of the dismissed suit by reason of breach of the
agreement that was the basis for dismissal.”89 The court noted that settlement
enforcement, “whether through award of damages or decree of specific
performance,” was different90 because it was “more than just a continuation or
renewal of the dismissed suit”91 and thus required its own basis for jurisdiction.92
After Kokkonen, the Sixth Circuit foreclosed a Rule 60(b) motion founded
on an alleged settlement breach. The court said that the rule could not support
enforcement of a settlement agreement not expressly incorporated in a court
order because relief from a final judgment was an extraordinary remedy available
only in exceptional circumstances.93 The request for a contempt finding was
deemed “clearly ‘more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit’”
and any use of the judgment modification rule would “create an exception to the
holding in Kokkonen that would swallow the rule.”94
The Seventh Circuit has held that “[n]othing in Kokkonen purports to change
the stringent standards that govern the availability of relief under Rule
60(b)(6),”95 so that a movant could not, in the guise of attempting to set aside an
order, seek judicial interpretation of a settlement that was not incorporated in a
court order and over which there was no retained jurisdiction.96
However, like the pre-Kokkonen split, there may now be a post-Kokkonen
split. One federal district court, after referencing Kokkonen, found “that federal
courts are empowered to reopen suits dismissed by reason of breach of a
settlement agreement by virtue of Rule 60(b)(6).”97 Another court allowed a
(6th Cir. 1976) (court had full power to vacate its order of dismissal when one party “attempted
repudiation of the agreement on which the dismissal rested”).
89. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
90. Id. Of course, there must also be some jurisdictional basis for a Rule 60(b) motion,
though such a basis was not discussed in Kokkonen. Authority over judgment modification motions
is rarely questioned on jurisdictional grounds.
91. Id.
92. Id. Judgment modification was discussed during the oral arguments in Kokkonen. See
Transcript of Oral Arguments, Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
How about any other 60(b)(6), the catch all, and the judge saying well, it sounds like a
pretty good 60(b) motion to me; I was listening to these two people debate what their
settlement was going to be, and they made certain representations, and one of them is
trying to get out of it. So I think that fits the 60(b)(6) catchall. It justifies relief to tell
me one thing and the [sic] go do another thing.
Id.
93. McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, 229 F.3d 491, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 503.
95. Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 123 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 1997).
96. Id.
97. Trade Arbed Inc. v. African Express 941 F. Supp. 68, 70 (E.D. La. 1996) (emphasis
omitted). See also Rovira v. Fairmont Hotel, 1997 WL 707115, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 1997) (“In
Kokkonen, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the power to enforce settlement
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Rule 60 motion in a more unusual setting; the case involved a settlement that had
been reached between the parties before the court entered a judgment based upon
a pending motion. The judge explained that as the “parties’ settlement agreement
preceded the entry of judgment [upon the grant of the motion], by the clerk of
this court the plaintiff is entitled to postjudgment relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(1) . . . on the grounds of mistake.”98 The court further explained “[i]t
would be this court’s mistake of fact, i.e., that the parties had not settled the
claims at bar before entry of judgment . . . that justifies relief.”99 Instead of
reopening the case, the district judge withdrew its ruling and gave the defendant
“thirty-five (35) days . . . to comply with the terms of the settlement
agreement.”100 The court stated that if the defendant failed to comply, “the
plaintiff may return . . . for whatever relief is appropriate.”101
E. Choosing the Applicable Contract Laws
When Kokkonen permits settlement enforcement, questions have arisen about
which contract laws apply. The Seventh Circuit recently ruled that “[t]he
uncertainty . . . over whether state or federal law would govern a suit to enforce
a settlement of a federal suit, has been dispelled; it is state law.”102 This ruling
applies to settlements involving both federal and state law claims.103 Yet, most
rules have exceptions and therein lies the rub. Helpful guidelines on any
exceptions to state law applicability are hard to find. A second appeals court has
simply declared that state contract law operates “unless it presents a significant
conflict with federal policy,”104 with such conflicts “few and restricted.”105
Another appeals court was more specific, holding that local law applies unless
the settlement is sought to be “enforced against the United States” or there was

agreements that produce stipulations of dismissal. . . . This ruling, however, does not prevent
federal courts from reopening dismissed suits when the interests of justice justify such relief.”);
Hernandez v. Compania Transatlantica, 1998 WL 241530, at *2 (E.D. La. May 7, 1998) (“Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) empowers a federal district court to reopen a dismissed suit due
to a party’s breach of a settlement agreement.”).
98. Davis v. Magnolia Lady Inc., 178 F.R.D. 473, 474 (N.D. Miss. 1998).
99. Id. at 474-75 (also relying on Rule 60(b)(6)) (emphasis omitted).
100. Id. at 476.
101. Id.
102. Lynch v. Samatamason, 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002).
103. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000) (federal question
claim involving issue of whether a settlement offer extended by the Assistant U.S. Attorney was
accepted by appellee); Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (diversity claim where
issue on appeal was whether daughter had the authority to bind mother to settlement agreement
reached in mediation).
104. Ciramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 131 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing
Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1977)).
105. Id. (quoting O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994).
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“a statute conferring lawmaking power on federal courts.”106
The exceptional conditions under which federal laws apply to settlements of
federal civil actions are difficult to discern from Supreme Court precedents. In
one case, federal decisional contract law on the validity of a written prelawsuit
release of a federal statutory claim, allegedly procured by fraud, was applied to
the settlement of a case filed in a state court because otherwise “federal
rights . . . could be defeated,” because settlements of claims under that federal
law “play an important part” in the “administration” of the relevant federal act,
and because if “federal law controls,” there would be “uniform application
throughout the country essential to effectuate” the purposes underlying the
federal statutory right to sue.107 And, in another case involving a different federal
statutory claim presented in a state tribunal, the high court simply said that
“waiver” of the “right to sue” was governed by federal law because “the policies
underlying [the federal statute may] in some circumstances render that waiver
unenforceable.”108
Based on such precedents, there are times when federal district courts should
employ federal contract law principles in reading federal case settlement
agreements. One district court nicely summarized the relevant factors.109 They
include: 1) whether Congress has expressed a policy of encouraging voluntary
settlement of the relevant federal statutory claims; 2) whether “the Supreme
Court has already articulated certain prerequisites to the validity of settlement
agreement” of any relevant federal claims; 3) whether any settled federal claims
are within exclusive federal court subject matter jurisdiction; 4) whether state
laws in the relevant area of law are preempted “through a comprehensive
statutory scheme”; 5) whether there is an expressed federal governmental interest
“in remedying unequal bargaining power” between the settling parties; 6)
whether the United States is a party to the settlements; and 7) whether Congress
empowered the federal courts “to create governing rules of law.”110
When state contract laws are employed to sustain and interpret settlement
agreements reached in federal civil actions, difficulties can arise because the
sources of state law extend far beyond the “substantive” matters demanded by the
Erie doctrine. Specifically, some state written civil procedure laws, seemingly
operative only in the state trial courts, are used in the federal district courts. For
example, federal courts have utilized a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure which
106. Makins v. District of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
107. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1952) (claim under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act). The decision seemingly was not followed in Good v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 384 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1967) (state law governs lawyer’s authority to
settle client’s FELA case) and Pulcinello v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 784 A.2d 122 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001) (FELA case settlement governed by state law on validity of oral agreements).
108. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1982) (civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). The decision was criticized in Michael E. Solimine, Enforcement and Interpretation of
Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295 (1988).
109. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 392 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
110. Id. at 398-401.
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states “no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will
be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the
record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”111 And at
times, but not always, federal courts employ state professional conduct and civil
procedure law standards to determine the authority of a person other than the
party to settle pending civil actions on behalf of that party.112
F. Choosing the Applicable Procedures
When a district court exercises jurisdiction over an alleged breach of a civil
case settlement there are a variety of procedures that may be used. Possible
procedures appear in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as in common
law decisions and statutes.113 Some, but not all, procedures are geared toward
enforcement and remedies on behalf of the party harmed by the settlement
breach.
For some settlement breaches, the court may proceed in contempt.114 There
are two forms of contempt, civil and criminal,115 and either form may be direct
or indirect. The major goals of criminal contempt are less connected to
enforcement, as they chiefly involve punishment and vindication.116 On the civil

111. In re Omni, 60 F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 11). The Texas
rules are said to “govern the procedure in the justice, county, and district courts of the State of
Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated.” TEX. R.
CIV . P. 2. A similar New York provision, CPLR § 2014, has prompted “disagreement” over its
applicability to federal civil actions in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Turk v. Chase
Manhattan Bank USA, NA, No. 00CIV1573CMGAY, 2001 WL 736814, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June
11, 2001).
112. Compare United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 986 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (federal
precedent regarding attorney settlement authority used); Reo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 98 F.3d 73, 77
(3d Cir. 1996) (under Federal Tort Claims Act, state law used to determine settlement authority of
representative of a child); Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 993 F. Supp. 225, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (pursuant to local federal rule, court dispenses with certain state law requirements governing
Guardian Ad Litem’s power to settle a civil case on behalf of adult incompetent to pursue her own
claims as technical compliance with state law would prompt “extended and prejudicial delay”).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000) (criminal contempt); FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (injunctions); FED.
R. CIV. P. 69 (writs of executions); FED. R. CIV. P. 70 (judgments for specific acts); Feiock v.
Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (reviewing civil and criminal contempt precedents).
114. Available procedures for certain civil case settlement breaches include criminal contempt,
18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (2000) (disobedience to lawful court order), and compensatory or coercive civil
contempt. D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 1993) (contempt may be
used only where breaches involve alleged violations of express and unequivocal commands of court
orders). For a review of the forms contempt and suggestions on their use, see Margit Livingston,
Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345 (2000).
115. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
116. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (criminal contempt includes disobedience to a lawful
court order).
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side, there may be either coercive civil contempt or compensatory civil
contempt.117 Before there is a contempt proceeding in the settlement breach
setting, there usually must be a failure of compliance with an express and
unequivocal command within a lawful court order.118 Thus, contempt may only
be available for a settlement breach where the agreement was incorporated into
a court order. If the settlement terms were sealed or otherwise outside a court
order, but jurisdiction over the settlement was retained, contempt may not be
immediately available, though other procedures may be used.119 Where contempt
is available, both civil and criminal proceedings may arise from a single act,
though because different procedures apply, they frequently will be presented
separately.120
A trial court may also proceed on settlement breaches by way of contract
dispute resolution. Here, settlement enforcement often follows the routine
contract dispute resolution procedures employed to resolve any factual and legal
disputes. Yet, the applicable procedures may not always be the same as they
would for ordinary contract disputes involving such matters as defective widgets;
for example, more “summary” procedures may be appropriate for settlement
enforcement.121
117. Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-29 (1994).
118. D. Patrick, Inc., 8 F.3d at 460. In rare settings, perhaps, breach of an unincorporated
settlement agreement may also be misbehavior in the vicinity of the court that obstructs the
administration of justice and triggers possible contempt. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1).
119. See, e.g., D. Patrick, Inc., 8 F.3d at 457-58, 462 (suggesting that while contempt
procedures were unavailable to enforce an earlier settlement that was not incorporated into a court
order, breach of contract procedures could be used because the trial court expressly retained
jurisdiction “for the purposes of the enforcement”); Central States S.E. & S.W. Pension Fund v.
Richardson Trucking, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 349, 350 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (“Here the orders in both cases
are in substance injunctive. However, the orders did not themselves set forth what payments the
defendants were required to make, but instead did nothing more than incorporate the terms of the
parties’ agreements with respect to payment schedules. The orders thus fail to meet the directive
of Rule 65(d), and even if they are disobeyed, they may not be made the subject of civil contempt
proceedings.”).
120. See, e.g., F.J. Hanshaw Enter., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
2001) (civil contempt finding affirmed, but criminal contempt finding reversed because procedural
protections were not present).
121. Often, in settlement enforcement settings, “summary” procedures involve resolution
without evidentiary hearings. Where necessary procedures entail evidentiary hearings following
formal discovery because of disputes over material issues of fact, jury trials may be needed.
Compare Millner v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1981) (when a material
dispute arises regarding a settlement agreement, the “trial court must . . . conduct a plenary
evidentiary hearing”); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., No. Civ.96-71-B, 1999 WL 33117190, at *1
(D. Me. Dec. 23, 1999) (usually no jury trial right in settlement enforcement proceedings, with
FELA claims possibly excepted); Ford v. Cotozems & S. Bank, 928 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (11th Cir.
1991) (no jury trial right). Summary settlement enforcement and ordinary contract enforcement
procedures both differ from contempt procedures that may be employed when settlement orders are
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Certain breaches of settlement pacts incorporated into judgments and
involving only “the payment of money” seemingly may also be processed
through writs of execution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a), “unless
the court directs otherwise.”122 Here, the procedures follow the practices of “the
state in which the district court is held.” These writs can involve such remedies
as attachment, garnishment, and sequestration.123 Unlike written federal laws,
some written state laws expressly recognize the opportunity for a judgment
creditor to choose between different enforcement procedures. For example, the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act says that terms of a dissolution
agreement “set forth in [a] judgment are enforceable by all remedies available for
enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable as contract
terms.”124
Choices of applicable procedures are constrained in some settings. Consider,
for example, cases where settling parties wish to keep their agreement secret, but
nevertheless have the district court retain at least some enforcement jurisdiction.
In one recent case, a newspaper sought to intervene in a civil action in order to
obtain a copy of such a settlement agreement.125 The magistrate judge had
approved the agreement, but “did not embody his approval in a judicial order that
would have made the agreement enforceable by contempt proceedings.”126 The
appeals court ruled that such an approval had “no legal significance” to
enforcement unless it was “embodied in a judicial order retaining jurisdiction of
the case in order to be able to enforce the settlement without a new lawsuit.”127
As to the wish to keep the settlement secret, the appeals court said, “the general
rule is that the record of a judicial proceeding is public” and that concealing
records disserves the values protected by the First Amendment and bars the
public from monitoring judicial performance adequately.128 The appeals court
found there was “a strong presumption,” rather than an absolute rule, of
disobeyed. See, e.g., D. Patrick, Inc., 8 F.3d at 459 (“because the contempt proceeding is
concerned solely with whether or not the respondent’s conduct violates a prior court order, the
parties cannot reasonably expect to litigate to the same extent that they might in a new and
independent civil action”); F.J. Hanshaw, 244 F.3d at 1143 n.11 (need finding of bad faith in civil
contempt proceeding, perhaps based on clear and convincing evidence).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a). In “extraordinary circumstances” Fed. R. Civ. P. 70 may be used.
See, e.g., Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1982) (“under the extraordinary
circumstances here where the [money] judgment is against a state which refuses to appropriate
funds through the normal process . . . any remedy provided in Rule 69 or Rule 70 to enforce the
award” is appropriate).
123. In re Merrill Lynch Relocation Mgmt., Inc., 812 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1987) (Rule
69(a) has been applied “to garnishment, mandamus, arrest, contempt of a party, and appointment
of receivers”).
124. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/502(e) (2002).
125. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 929.
128. Id. at 927-28.
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openness.129 So upon “a compelling interest in secrecy,” the record of an
enforceable settlement could be sealed.130 The court noted most “settlement
agreements, like most arbitration awards and discovery materials, are private
documents. . . not judicial records,” and thus the issue of balancing the interest
in promoting settlements by preserving secrecy versus the interest in making
public materials upon which judicial decisions are based does not arise.131 The
issue does not arise because there is “no judicial decision” where there is “a
stipulation of dismissal . . . without further ado or court action,” leaving the
settlement with “the identical status as any other private contract.”132 Since the
trial judge in the case had participated in “the making of the settlement,” the
appeals court found the “fact and consequence of his participation are public
acts.”133 So, future ancillary enforcement jurisdiction may be unavailable to
many parties who wish secrecy for their settlements.
Choices of applicable procedures are also constrained in certain settings
where settling parties or their attorneys may later wish to pursue an award of
attorney’s fees. For example, fees may be awarded to “the prevailing party” in
certain civil rights actions.134 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a
determination of “legal merit” is a condition for such an award and that a consent
decree may meet this condition if it involves judicial approval and oversight of
“court-ordered change in the legal relationship” between the settling parties.135
One federal court has ruled that such a consent decree arises when a trial court
incorporates a settlement into an order, making the contractual obligations
enforceable as an order of court, but may not arise when a trial court retains
enforcement jurisdiction over a settlement which has not been incorporated.136
G. Discretionary Refusals of Settlement Enforcement Requests
Where a federal district court has incorporated terms of a settlement
agreement into an order or has retained jurisdiction to enforce a settlement
agreement, can it later decline to enforce the settlement even though requested,
leaving the matter to other courts? If so, under what circumstances? Or, is such

129. Id. at 928.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 929.
134. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
135. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
604 (2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792
(1989)). The same “prevailing party” standard seemingly operates in other civil rights settings
where fee awards are allowed. See Race v. Toledo-Davita, 291 F.3d 857 (1st Cir. 2002) (America
with Disabilities Act claims); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288
F. 3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (using standard in fee requests under Freedom of Information Act).
136. See Roberson v. Giuliani, 2002 WL 253950, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2002); Smyth v.
Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 285 (4th Cir. 2002).
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enforcement exclusively within the subject matter jurisdiction of that district
court, so that no other court (federal or state) may enforce? To date there has
been little attention to these questions.
We reject the notion of exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court
where the settlement was reached, even where there is an incorporation of the
agreement or a retention of jurisdiction. Where enforcement jurisdiction is
ancillary, judicial discretion about its exercise should remain available as it does
in similar settings, such as when federal district courts are asked to exercise
“supplemental” jurisdiction.137 When a settlement dispute involves “a novel or
complex issue of [s]tate law,”138 federal enforcement jurisdiction often should be
declined. Yet, employment of the same standards in enforcement settings that
are used in other ancillary jurisdiction settings would be inappropriate. Thus,
enforcement should not be declined simply because all claims over which there
was original jurisdiction have been dismissed.139 If the discretion to decline to
exercise ancillary enforcement power is used too liberally where the settlement
was incorporated into a court order or where jurisdiction was expressly retained,
the future settlements will be deterred and certain judicial efficiencies will be
undermined. Therefore, there should be very little discretion to refuse
enforcement requests where earlier court orders expressly provided for
“exclusive” jurisdiction over later disputes.140
In addition to at least some of the standards used with statutory supplemental
jurisdiction, we posit additional general guidelines on discretionary refusals of
settlement enforcement requests. First, refusals should be more difficult where
federal law claims were settled because there is a greater likelihood that federal
laws will govern legal issues arising during enforcement proceedings. Second,
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000). The extent to which enforcement jurisdiction may be
exercised under the supplemental jurisdiction statute remains somewhat unclear. To us, at least
some exercise is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (allowing supplemental jurisdiction over
“claims that are so related to claims in the action within . . . original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy”). See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
379 (1994) (recognizing that in some instances settlement enforcement claims and claims earlier
presented for judicial resolution may have something to do with each other in that they are all “in
varying respects and degrees factually interdependent”).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (granting court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction
when “claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law”).
139. But see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (granting court discretion to decline supplemental
jurisdiction when “court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).
140. While parties cannot establish federal district court subject matter jurisdiction by contract,
the incorporation of an exclusive venue provision in a court order in a pending civil action signifies
a judicial recognition that there will be ancillary jurisdiction in certain events, in addition to
providing a judicial promise that, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it will be exercised.
See, e.g., Manges v. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler, 37 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1994). But
see Housing Group v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (Ct. App. 2001) (persons
involved in settlement talks outside of any civil lawsuit cannot agree to place settlement before a
trial court in order to secure possible court enforcement because there is no justiciable controversy).
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refusals should be more difficult where the same district judge will preside over
the settlement enforcement proceedings as presided over the settlement talks
because desired efficiencies are more likely to occur.141 Third, refusals should
be easier when federal governmental interests are diminished due to settlement
agreements which expressly require that state laws govern any future disputes.
Fourth, refusals should be more difficult where enforcement proceedings will
involve settlement breaches that violate court orders because they more readily
implicate the power of the courts to “protect” their proceedings and to
“vindicate” their authority.142 Fifth, refusals should be easier where enforcement
proceedings will not involve extensive inquiries into court records, such as
hearing transcripts and filed papers. Sixth, refusals should be more difficult
where earlier and related settlement enforcement proceedings have already
occurred in the federal district court.
III. IM PROVING SETTLEM ENT ENFORCEM ENT IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Many of the difficulties with federal settlement enforcement proceedings can
be reduced by new written federal laws. We posit that such new laws are needed
both from the U.S. Supreme Court, as the federal civil procedure rulemaker, and
from the Congress. As rulemaker, the Court should consider both amendments
to existing civil procedure rules and entirely new rules. We urge Congress at this
time to focus only on changes to the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
Difficulties regarding the incorporation of settlement terms into court orders
and the retention of jurisdiction for later enforcement could be reduced through
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. The rule already speaks to
judgments upon jury verdicts or other decisions by juries, as well as to judgments
upon decisions by courts without juries.143 An amended rule could be
accompanied by new forms, which would reduce confusion, as they would be
“sufficient” if used.144 An amended rule could be modeled on some existing state
civil procedure laws. For example, a Texas statute says:
(a) If the parties reach a settlement and execute a written agreement
disposing of the dispute, the agreement is enforceable in the same
manner as any other written contract.
(b) The court in its discretion may incorporate the terms of the
agreement in the court’s final decree disposing of the case.
(c) A settlement agreement does not affect an outstanding court order
unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into a subsequent
decree.145
141. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (“efficient” to adjudicate settlement breach with claim
prompting the settlement where facts underlying both have much “to do with each other”).
142. Id. at 380-81.
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 58.
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (forms in Appendix of Forms are sufficient).
145. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §154.071.
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And, a California Code of Civil Procedure says:
If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties
outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement
of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment
pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the
court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement
until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.146
Difficulties regarding discretionary refusals of future or present settlement
enforcement requests could be reduced through amendments to the supplemental
jurisdiction statute.147 That statute is applied today, for the most part, to the initial
adjudicatory authority over civil claims pleaded or otherwise presented before
or during so-called trials on the merits, typically encompassing “factually
interdependent” claims under Kokkonen.148
Further difficulties with settlement enforcement procedures can be
diminished with amendments to Federal Civil Procedure Rules 65 and 69.
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) could address
enforcement issues arising from settlements involving equitable remedies.
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 69(a) could address
enforcement issues arising from settlements involving monetary payments.
Should codification of civil contempt procedures be found necessary, a new
federal civil procedure rule seems the best vehicle to do so149 using several local
court rules and written state laws as models.150
CONCLUSION
Settlements of federal civil actions may, but need not, be subject to later
judicial enforcement. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Insurance Co., one significant limitation on enforcement
proceedings is subject matter jurisdiction because federal district courts are
“courts of limited jurisdiction.” Under Kokkonen, enforcement jurisdiction may
be “independent,” but usually is “ancillary” because state law claims typically are
146. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §664.6 (1987 & Supp. 2002). Prior to its enactment, “California
appellate decisions were in conflict as to the appropriate procedure for enforcement of an agreement
to settle pending litigation.” Assemi v. Assemi, 872 P.2d 1190, 1194-95 (Cal. 1994). But see LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (1994) (settlement recited in open court “confers” upon each party “the
right of judicially enforcing its performance”).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
148. A review and critique of the supplemental jurisdiction statute appears in Jeffrey A.
Parness & Daniel J. Sennott, Expanded Recognition in Written Laws of Ancillary Federal Court
Powers: Supplementing the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, ___ U. PITT. L. REV. ___ (2002).
149. Acts constituting criminal contempt are already expressly addressed in 18 U.S.C. § 401
(2000). These statutory standards have traditionally been used to help define acts constituting civil
contempt.
150. See, e.g., ILL. CIR. CT. R. FOR FIFTEENTH CIR. 11.1 (2000); CONN. SUP. R. § 1-14 (1999).
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involved where there is no diversity of citizenship. Ancillary enforcement
powers may be exercised by district courts either where claims were initially
presented for adjudication and disputes arising from later settlements are
“factually interdependent,” or where recognition of enforcement authority
enables courts “to function successfully,” such as where courts need to insure
that their orders are not “flouted or imperiled.” Typically, enforcement authority
is exercised so that the courts function successfully.
Difficulties have surfaced regarding this ancillary settlement enforcement
jurisdiction. They concern how to incorporate settlement terms into court orders
and how otherwise to retain jurisdiction, whether settlement disputes may prompt
the reopening of judgments, and what contract laws and what procedures should
apply when federal case settlements are enforced. There are additional troubles
which have yet to surface significantly, including whether there is judicial
discretion to refuse requests that future enforcement jurisdiction be retained and
whether certain settlement disputes can prompt discretionary refusals of available
enforcement jurisdiction.
We believe new written federal laws are needed now to address many of
these difficulties. Relevant lawmakers include both the U.S. Supreme Court, as
promulgator of the federal rules of civil procedure, and the Congress. We
suggest amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on judgment entry,
on judgments involving money and on permanent injunctions, as well as changes
to the supplemental jurisdiction statute.

